Contractualism Jussi Suikkanen – University of Birmingham This is the introduction of a book on contractualism soon to be published in Cambridge University Press's Elements in Ethics series (edited by Dale Miller and Ben Eggleston). Abstract: This essay begins by describing T.M. Scanlon's contractualism according to which an action is right when it is authorised by the moral principles no one could reasonably reject. This view has argued to have implausible consequences with regards to how different-sized groups, non-human animals, and cognitively limited human beings should be treated. It has also been accused of being theoretically redundant and unable to vindicate the so-called deontic distinctions. I then distinguish between the general contractualist framework and Scanlon's version of contractualism. I explain how the general framework enables us to formulate many other versions of contractualism some of which can already be found in the literature. Understanding contractualism in this new way enables us both to understand the structural similarities and differences between different versions of contractualism and also to see the different objections to contractualism as internal debates about which version of contractualism is correct. 1. Introduction This essay has two aims. It first intends to bring its reader up to speed with the recent developments in contractualist ethical theorising. The idea of understanding morality in terms of a contract is old. It was already described in Plato's masterpiece The Republic about 2400 years ago (Plato, Republic: 358e– 359b). Different social contract theories were also popular during the Early Modern period (1500–1800) when Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) and many others developed the view further. This essay will, however, focus only on the most recent discussions of the view. They tend to begin from a version of contractualism, which T.M. Scanlon introduced in 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism' (1982) and then developed further in What We Owe to Each Other (1998). Chapter 2 will outline Scanlon's theory, which is based on the moral principles no one could reasonably reject. Chapter 3 will then explain the main objections to Scanlon's contractualism. It has been argued that the view has implausible consequences with respect to how different-sized groups, non-human animals and cognitively limited human beings are to be treated. It has also been claimed that Scanlon's contractualism cannot vindicate the so-called deontic distinctions and that it is merely a redundant theoretical device that is not needed for understanding right and wrong. Scanlon's contractualism is, of course, not the only contemporary version of contractualism. Thus, in section 5.2, I will outline Derek Parfit's (2011) Kantian contractualism, Nicholas Southwood's (2010) deliberative contractualism and David Gauthier's (1986) contractarianism. I will explain both what is common to these contractualist views and also how they differ from one another. Thus, by reading chapters 2 and 3 and section 5.2 (and also the section 5.4 that discusses contractualist responses to the main objections to the view), the reader should be able to understand the key issues in the recent debates about contractualism in normative ethics. This essay, however, also makes an original contribution. It begins from the observation that ethicists have recently come to understand contractualism's main competitor, consequentialism, in a new way. Instead of taking consequentialism to be a distinct view of which actions are right and wrong, many have started to think of consequentialism as a flexible framework in which different ethical views can be formulated as versions of consequentialism. The so-called consequentialisers have tried to show that, for every plausible first-order ethical view, there is a version of consequentialism that is co-extensive 2 with it (Dreier, 2011). This project promises that the previous debates concerning which ethical theory is true can now be translated into disagreements over which version of consequentialism is correct. Chapter 4 will summarise these recent radical developments. Chapter 5 then suggests that we should revise our understanding of contractualism in the same way. It argues that we should draw a distinction between different versions of contractualism (including Scanlon's contractualism) and the general framework of contractualism in which different versions of contractualism can be formulated. This allows us both to explain more precisely how contractualist ethical theories differ from consequentialist theories and to state the differences between different versions of contractualism more accurately. Section 5.3 will furthermore argue that the contractualist framework is just as flexible as the consequentialist one. It turns out that, for every plausible ethical view, there is likewise a version of contractualism that is co-extensive with it. Section 5.4 will then explain how this result has radical consequences for our understanding of the traditional objections to contractualism. The previous disagreements over these objections can now be understood as internal questions concerning which version of contractualism is most plausible. Chapter 6 finally concludes by first summarising the main discussions of this essay. It also considers what consequences these new developments in our understanding of the traditional ethical theories will have for the future debates in normative ethics. I suggest that we should no longer argue over which ethical theory is in some general sense true or correct. This is because it is likely that there is a version of every major ethical theory that corresponds to the correct view of which actions are right and wrong. Rather, we should take seriously the idea that, when we try to solve difficult new ethical problems, these theories as general frameworks direct our attention to different kind of considerations. The consequentialist framework makes us investigate which theories of value are plausible whereas the contractualist framework guides us consider what kind of views of reasons or rationality we should accept. My pragmatic suggestion then is that we should accept ethical theories on the basis of how helpful ways of thinking about new ethical problems they provide. I will also recommend accepting a form of pluralism. In advance, we have no reason to think that one framework of ethical theorising will be the most fruitful one in every context. Rather, different ethical views may well enable us to investigate different problem cases in more illuminating ways.